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SEXUAL EQUALITY UNDER THE




The equal status and dignity of men and women under the law is the
animating purpose of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).'
By contrast, the framers of the fourteenth amendment2 did not contem-
plate sex equality. Boldly dynamic interpretation, departing radically
from the original understanding, is required to tie to the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause a command that government
treat men and women as individuals equal in rights, responsibilities,
and opportunities. This article discusses the two rubrics under which
gender-based classifications in the law might be tested: first, the equal
protection principle explicit in the fourteenth amendment and implicit
in the fifth amendment; 3 and second, the sex equality principle
presented in the proposed Equal Rights Amendment. Central to the
* A lecture delivered at Washington University on February 14, 1979, as the fifth in a series
on fhlt" Quest for Equality
** Professor of Law, Columbia University. B.A., 1954, Cornell University; LL.B., 1959, Co-
lumbia University.
1, The proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution reads:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.
S.J, Rc. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CoNc. REc. 271 (1971); S.J. Res. 9, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., 117
CONG. REC. 272 (1971); H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 526 (1971). Time
t ratification has been extended from March 22, 1979, the limitation period prescribed in the
proposing clause preceding the text of the ERA, to June 30, 1982. H.J. Res. 638, 95th Cong., 2d
S s., 124 CONG. REc. H7685 (1978), enacted 124 CONG. REC. S17318 (Oct. 6, 1978).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see Crozier, Constitutionality of Discrimination Based on Sex,
5 B.U.L. REv. 723, 725 (1935) ("If in the law and public opinion of 1865-73 race discrimination
stood at the head of all discriminations as needing attention, it is certain that sex discrimination
Axa, at the end of the line.").
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court has interpreted the fifth amendment due
process clause to include an equal protection component generally approached in "precisely the
.,ame" way as the fourteenth amendment's express equal protection clause. Weinberger v. Wie-
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discussion is the question: Is the ERA needed, given the generality and
development potential of the equal protection guarantee?
The fifth and fourteenth amendments instruct that neither the United
States nor any State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." The ERA's substantive section reads:
"Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex."4 Both the equal pro-
tection and the equal rights formulations are directed to laws and the
actions of officialdom; private action unaccompanied by official partici-
pation or stimulation remains outside the purview of both provisions.-
II. EQUAL PROTECTION
A. The Original Understanding
The equal protection guarantee, phrased with majestic sweep, applies
to all persons, and the Supreme Court has acknowledged from the start
that women are "persons." 6 But the legislative history of the fourteenth
amendment clarified that government was free to rank "persons" on a
number of bases without affront to the equal protection clause; the
prime examples, age, economic or social condition, and sex.' Consis-
tent with the framers' perspective, the Supreme Court explained that
although women and children are indeed "persons" and may be "citi-
zens" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment, both are ap-
propriately placed in compartments separate from men.8
When the post-Civil War amendments were added to the Constitu-
tion, women were not accorded the vote, the right now regarded by the
Supreme Court as most basic to adult citizenship. Married women in
many states could not contract, hold property, litigate on their own be-
half, or even control their own earnings.9 The fourteenth amendment
senfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975). See Karst, The Fflh Amendment~' Guarantee of Equal Pro-
teetion, 55 N.C.L. REv. 541 (1977).
4. Two other sections complete the ERA. See note I supra.
5. On the "state action" concept as it bears on constitutional gender discrimination claims,
see Ginsburg, Women as Full Members of the Club: An Evolving American Ideal, 6 HUMAN
RIGHTS 2, 6-14 (1977).
6. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 168 (1874).
7. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1293 (1866) (Statement of Rep. John A.
Bingham).
8. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 174-76 (1874); cf. Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (commenting in casual dictum that although race was an imper-
missible criterion for jury service, no doubt a state "may confine [jury] selection to males").




left all that untouched. To the nineteenth century jurist, change in wo-
men's status, alteration of laws restricting a woman's options, was state
business, not fit subject matter for federal statutory or constitutional
resolution.
In part reflective of the original understanding, women litigated few
sex equality claims in the eight decades following ratification of the
fourteenth amendment. The brave handful who did were unsuccessful:
Myra Bradwell, in 1873, was told she had no federal constitutional
right to practice law; t° Virginia Minor, less than two years later, was
told participation in the processes of democratic government through
the franchise was properly reserved to men;I t bar owner Goesaert and
her bartending daughter, in 1948, were required to close up shop be-
cause Michigan law, the High Court ruled, legitimately required that
husband or father own the establishment;' 2 Ms. Hoyt, whose baseball
bat struck a death blow to a husband alleged to have wounded, in-
sulted, and humiliated her to the breaking point, was told, in 1961, that
the Constitution guaranteed her no right to a fair chance for female
peers on the jury roll. 3
Opinions generally rationalized sex classifications not as stigmatizing
"back of the bus" regulation, but as favoring or protecting the fairer or
weaker sex, as operating benignly to place and keep women on a pedes-
tal. 14 The original understanding underpinning High Court precedent
from 1873 to 1961, however, was sometimes described without a rose-
colored lens. Thus, in 1947, Justice Jackson cogently summarized the
state of sex equality constitutional doctrine up to the current decade.
That year, the Court rejected a challenge to New York's automatic ex-
emption of women from jury service.' 5 Justice Jackson's opinion for
School Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1033, 1057-70, 1082-83
(1972).
10. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1873).
11, Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 177-78 (1874).
12. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948).
13. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1961).
14. See Eastwood, The Double Standard of Justice: W omen!s Rights Under the Constitution, 5
VAL. U. L. REV. 281 (1971). The protective rationale was used regularly in the first decades of this
century, to justify restrictive labor legislation for women. See Comment, Regulation of Conditions
ofEmplorment of Women: .4 Critique oJ Muller v. Oregon, 13 B.U.L. REv. 276 (1933). The cur-
rent approach, required by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970),
is, in most situations, across-the-board wage, hours, health, and safety regulation, protective of
male as well as female workers.
15. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947). Missouri and Tennessee retained similar exemp-
tions until 1979. See Duren v. Missouri, 99 S, Ct. 664 (1979) (declaring unconstitutional Missouri's
exemption for "any woman").
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the Court explains:
The contention that women should be on the jury is not based on the
Constitution, it is based on a changing view of the rights and responsibili-
ties of women in our public life, which has progressed in all phases of life,
including jury duty, but has achieved constitutional compulsion on the
states only in the grant of the franchise by the nineteenth amendment.' 6
The Constitution, in other words, gave women the vote, but only that.
In other respects, our fundamental instrument of government was
thought an empty cupboard for sex equality claims.
B. Doctrinal Development in the 1970:s
The Supreme Court, through the 1960's, purported to adhere to a
two-tier model for equal protection review.' 7 Most legislation was
ranked at the lower tier and survived judicial inspection if rationaly
related to a legitimate governmental objective.' 8 On the other hand,
rights denominated fundamental (voting, for example),' 9 or classifica-
tions labeled suspect (race is the prime example)2" were ranged on the
upper tier and subjected to rigorous review. To survive inspection, the
legislative objective had to be compelling, and the classification neces-
sary to its accomplishment."'
Equal protection adjudication in fact is not so mechanical, clear, and
certain, as commentators,22 lower courts, 2 3 and some of the Justices24
observed, particularly in the early 1970's. Sex-based classification,
most notably, appeared to be inching up to a place somewhere in be-
tween the two tiers.2'
16. 332 U.S. at 290.
17. See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword" In Search of Evohing
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I (1972);
Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword" Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amend.
ment, 91 HARV. L. REV. I (1977); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1065 (1969).
18. See, eg., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway
Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
19. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
20. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
21. See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 17.
22. See Gunther, supra note 17.
23. E.g., Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225, 229 (4th Cir. 1973).
24. E.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458-59 (1973) (White, J., concurring); San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
25. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1060-77 (1978); Karst, supra note 17, at




A start was made in 1971, in Reed v. Reed,26 when a unanimous
Court held inconsistent with equal protection an Idaho statute giving
men a preference over women for appointment as estate administra-
tors. The terse Reed opinion acknowledged no break with empty-cup-
board precedent, but Court-watchers recognized something new was in
the wind.
Two years later, in Frontiero v. Richardson,27 the Court held married
women in the uniformed services entitled to the same fringe benefits as
married men. Four of the Justices, in a plurality opinion, ranked sex a
"suspect" criterion, warranting the close review the Court gives above
all to race discrimination, but also to discrimination based on national
origin and religion. Four, however, is one vote short of a Supreme
Court majority. No fifth vote has emerged to range sex among the
"suspect" categories.
Justice Powell, concurring in Frontiero,28 identified a prime source of
the reticence exhibited by the Court's majority. The unalterable his-
toric fact is that our eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Constitution-
makers evidenced no concern at all about the equality of men and wo-
men before the law. The Court must tread lightly, Justice Powell cau-
tioned, when it enters the sticky marshland between constitutional
interpretation, a proper judicial task, and constitutional amendment, a
job for federal and state legislators.
Backsliding or at least line-holding occurred in the High Court's next
two confrontations: in Kahn v. Shevin (1974)29 and Schlesinger v. Bal-
lard (1975),3 ° the historic "benign" classification explanation for sex
discrimination recaptured the Court.
Kahn upheld exclusion of widowers from Florida's real-property tax
exemption (worth fifteen dollars annually) accorded widows along with
the blind and the totally disabled. To widower Kahn, the classification
in question, dating from 1885, was an historical hangover reflecting the
lawmakers' view of a wife more as her husband's ward than as his peer.
But the Court's majority accepted Florida's argument that the dispen-
sation fairly compensated lone women for the disadvantages they bear
in economic endeavor.
Permissible compensation was the theme again in Schlesinger v. Bal-
26, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
27. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
28, Id. at 691 (Powell, J., concurrng).
29. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
30. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
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lard, in which the Court held it was not a denial of equal protection to
hold a male naval officer to a strict "up or out" system (out when twice
passed over for promotion), while guaranteeing a female officer thir-
teen years before mandatory discharge for lack of promotion. Neither
contender in Ballard challenged the discrimination responsible for pro-
motion of men more rapidly than women-the drastically curtailed job
training and assignments available to Navy women.31
Later 1975 decisions returned to the Reed-Frontiero track. Taylor v.
Louisiana32 overturned a 1961 precedent, Hoyt v. Florida,33 and held
that women could not be exempted from jury duty on the assumption
they were occupied day-round tending to hearth, husband, and chil-
dren. Stanton v. Stanton34 declared incompatible with equal protection
a Utah law that required parents to support a son until twenty-one, a
daughter only until eighteen. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld35 held a wid-
owed father, who wished to care for his infant personally, entitled to
the same child-in-care social security benefits a widowed mother
receives.
The 1971 to 1975 challengers, in Reed, Frontiero, Kahn, Taylor, Wie-
senfeld and Stanton, contended against legislative line-drawing based
on gross ranking of females as persons concerned with "the home and
the rearing of the family," males, with "the marketplace and the world
of ideas."36 Their arguments were circumspect. They did not assert
that these propositions were inaccurate as generalizations. Rather, they
questioned the law's treatment of women and men who did not fit the
stereotype as if they did, and the fairness of gender pigeon-holing in
lieu of neutral, functional description. The Court held back doctrinal
development, but its opinions evidenced dawning awareness that the
traditional legislative slotting had the earmarks of self-fulfilling proph-
ecy. Thus, in Stanton, the Court said as to the age-of-majority
differential:
31. Significant change has occurred since Ballard. Congress has authorized admission of
women to the military academies. Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 10
U.S.C. § 4342 (1976). 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (1976), which excludes women from Navy vessels other
than transports and hospital ships, has been declared unconstitutional. Owens v. Brown, 455 F.
Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 1978). On women's restricted avenues in the armed forces and proposals for
widening opportunities, see M. BINKIN & S. BACH, WOMEN AND THE MILITARY (Brookings Insti-
tution 1977); Note, The Equal Rights .4mendment and the Military, 82 YALE L.J. 1533 (1973).
32. 419 U.S. 522 (1975),followedin Duren v. Missouri, 99 S. Ct. 664 (1979).
33. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
34. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
35. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).




To distinguish between [boy and girl] on educational grounds is to be self-
serving: if the female is not to be supported so long as the male, she
hardly can be expected to attend school as long as he does, and bringing
her education to an end earlier coincides with the role-typing society has
long imposed.37
The Court's movement away from the empty-cupboard interpreta-
tion of equal protection in relation to sex equality claims reflects soci-
ety's transition to a new period in the history of humankind. An early
indicator of it attracted scant attention. In the years 1947 to 1961,
before the civil rights movement captured headlines, before Betty
Friedan wrote The Feminine Mstique,38 there was unprecedented
growth in employment outside the home of women ages forty-five to
sixty-four.39 A steep increase for younger women followed later, coin-
ciding with, and shored up by, a revived feminist movement-a bur-
geoning movement caused by, and in turn spotlighting, dramatic
alterations in women's lives. Among the salient factors, a sharp decline
in necessary home-centered activity. Few goods we consume at home
must be made there nowadays. Coupled with that, expansion of the
economy's service sector opened places for women in traditional as well
as new occupations. A further key item, curtailed population goals and
more effective means of controlling reproduction. Added to the pic-
ture, vastly extended life spans, meaning that for most of our adult
years, small children requiring close care are not part of the household.
Inflation, too, has boosted the attraction of gainful employment for
wife as well as husband. These conditions account in significant mea-
sure for the prevalence of the two-earner family, a pattern becoming
more common than the family in which husband is sole breadwinner.4"
Within a dozen years, the Bureau of Labor Statistics projects, two-
thirds of all women ages twenty-five to fifty-four will be gainfully
37. Id at 15.
38 B. FRIEDAN, THE FE%I1NINE MYSTIQUE (1963).
39. Labor force participation rates for women ages 45 to 54 were 24.5% in 1940, 49.5% in
1960, 54.9% in 1974: for women ages 55 to 64, participation rates were 18% in 1940, 37.4% in 1960,
41.7% in 1974. "By 1960, the rate for women 45 to 54... had risen to such an extent that it was
noticeably higher than the proportion for 20- to 24-year-old women. ... WOMIEN'S BUREAU,
EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK ON WOMEN
WORKERS 12 (1975).
40. In 1976, in 55% (23,581.000) of families in which husband was gainfully employed
(42,624,000), wife was also gainfully employed. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, U.S. WORKING WOMEN: A DATABOOK 37 (1977).
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employed.4'
My Columbia colleague, economist Eli Ginzberg, appraised the sum
of these changes as "the single most outstanding phenomenon of our
century."42 Automobiles, planes, nuclear power plants, all brought
about by technology, he called "infrastructural changes." "Important
as they are, they do not go [as directly and deeply] to the guts of a
society,. . . how it works and how it plays, how people relate to each
other, whether they have children and how they bring them up."
With the change Eli Ginzberg called millenial as the backdrop, the
Supreme Court, in the 1976 Term, openly acknowledged that gender-
based classification attracted an elevated equal protection review stan-
dard, a standard more exacting than lower tier "rational basis," albeit
less rigorous than upper tier "strict scrutiny." This middle- or perhaps
upper-middle-level review standard was articulated initially in 1976 in
Craig v. Boren:43 "To withstand constitutional challenge. . . classifi-
cations by gender must serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."44
Craig held unconstitutional an Oklahoma "boy-protective" law, a pro-
vision allowing girls to purchase 3.2 beer at age eighteen, but requiring
boys to wait until age twenty-one. In a less gossamer case argued in
tandem with Craig, Califano v. Goldfarb,45 heightened review figured
again. The Court held impermissible the social security scheme quali-
fying a wage earner's widow for survivor's benefits automatically, a
wage earner's widower only upon proof that his wife supplied three-
fourths of the couple's support. But the bench was sharply divided in
the more weighty case. In Craig, the Court stood seven-to-two; Gold-
farb was a five-to-four cliffhanger.46
Rulings in the social security cases, Wiesenfeld47 and Goldfarb,4" are
41. Fullerton & Flaim, New Labor Force Predictions in 1990, in BUREAU OF LABOR STATIS-
TICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW 3, 5.
42. Quoted in Briggs, How You Going to Get 'Em Back in the Kitchen? (You Aren ?.), FORBES,
Nov. 15, 1977, at 177-78.
43. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
44. Id. at 197. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra note 25, at 177.
45. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
46. Seven opinions were written in Craig. The Goldfarb division was four-one-four; the plu-
rality focused on discrimination against the female as wage earner. Justice Stevens described dis-
crimination against the widower as "the accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking
about females." 430 U.S. at 223 (Stevens, J., concurring).
47. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).




not easily reconciled with the Court's approach in Kahn v. Shevin4 9 and
Schlesinger i'. Ballard,5" in which sex classifications were upheld as
"benign." In Califano v. Webster,5 the Court essayed a synthesis, the
five Justices responsible for the Goldfarb judgment subscribed to a per
curiam opinion in Webster distinguishing from knee-jerk categoriza-
tion by sex a law in fact designed to ameliorate disadvantages women
experience.
Webster upheld a classification, effective from 1956 to 1972, estab-
lishing a more favorable social security benefit calculation formula for
retired female workers than for retired male workers.12 But the legisla-
tive history indicated that this scheme, unlike the one in Goldfarb, had
been conceived, at least in significant part, as a response to discrimina-
tion commonly encountered by gainfully employed women; specifi-
cally, depressed wages for "women's work," and early retirement
employers routinely forced on women but not on men.53
Congress phased out the differential in 1972.5' By then, the Equal
Pay Act (1963) 5" and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196456 were on
the books and had been extended to cover most sectors of the economy,
encompassing public as well as private employment. Both acts directly
prohibit the discriminatory employer practices that supplied a rationale
for the 1956 sex-specific classification. Apparently for that reason,
Congress dropped the classification; it did so by equalizing
up-extending to men the more favorable calculation once reserved for
women.
57
The Webster per curiam, following the Wiesenfeld-Goldfarb line, de-
clares post hoc rationalization unacceptable to sustain laws in fact
rooted in a "romantically paternalistic"5 view of women as men's sub-
ordinates. While tilting toward a general rule of equal treatment, the
per curiam approves a slim corridor for genuinely compensatory classi-
fication--classification (1) in fact adopted for remedial reasons rather
49. 416 U.S. 351 (1974); see text following notes 29-30 supra.
50 419 U,S, 498 (1975); see text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
51. 430 U.S, 313 (1977).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(3) (1976) (amended 1976); see 430 U.S. at 313-15.
53. See 430 U.S. at 318.
54 Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 104(b). 86 Stat. 1340 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 417(b)(3) (1976)).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976) (amended 1972).
5t 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976) (amended 1972).
57. Pub. L, No. 92-603, § 104(b), 86 Stat. 1340 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 417(b)(3) (1976)).
58. Cf Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (characterizing as "romantic pater-
nalism" some laws purporting to protect or favor women, but in practical effect discriminating
again, them by confining their activity and opportunity).
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than out of prejudice about "the way women are," and (2) trimly tai-
lored in scope and time to match the remedial end.
In Regents of the University of Cal/fornia v. Bakke,5 9 Justice Brennan,
dissenting in part, cited Webster as a pathmarker.6 ° In contrast, Justice
Powell, author of the prevailing opinion in Bakke; wrote that "the
Court has never viewed gender-based classification as inherently sus-
pect or as comparable to racial or ethnic classifications for the purpose
of equal-protection analysis."'6' The comment is reminiscent of Justice
Powel's cautious concurring opinion in Frontiero,62 but its implications
are less than crystal clear. Did Justice Powell mean law-sanctioned
preferential treatment for women should be less vulnerable to chal-
lenge in court than preferential treatment for racial and ethnic groups
saddled with "a lengthy and tragic history" 63 of adverse discrimina-
tion? That seems an anomalous position. Did he mean as well that
courts should have a higher tolerance for official discrimination against
women than for such discrimination against racial and ethnic
minorities?'
Along with the muddled Bakke return, Vorchheimer v. School Dis-
59. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
60. Id. at 358-59 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
61. 438 U.S. at 303.
62. 411 U.S. at 691. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
63. 438 U.S. at 303. Earlier, in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1 (1973), Justice Powell, writing for the Court's majority, commented that "the traditional indicia
of suspectness" exist when a class is "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history
of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." Id. at 28.
64. This meaning might be inferred from Justice Powell's statement in Bakke that "the per-
ception of racial classifications as inherently odious stems from a lengthy and tragic history that
gender-based classifications do not share." 438 U.S. at 303. Earlier, however, the Court had dis-
tinguished classifications based on iUegitimacy from race and sex classifications by commenting
that "illegitimacy does not carry an obvious badge, as race or sex do," and that "discrimination
against illegitimates has never approached the severity or pervasiveness of the historic legal and
political discrimination against women and Negroes." Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506
(1975).
On the oversight involved in lumping together women and ghettoized minorities for all pur-
poses, the different generators of race and sex discrimination, the areas where similar remedies are
appropriate, and the areas where distinct approaches are required, see Ginsburg, Gender and the
Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 28-40 (1975) (most nonminority females do not encounter a
formidable risk of "death at an early age," the product of generations of segregation in education,
housing, community life; for females, customary responsibility for household management and
care of young children create stubborn psychological and logistical barriers to achieving equal
opportunity). See also Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism and Preferential Treatment. An A4pproach to
the Topics, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 581 (1977).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss1/19
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trict of Philadelphia65 indicates the unstable state of current equal pro-
tection-sex discrimination development. Vorchheimer was the final
joust in the Supreme Court's 1976 term encounter with official line-
drawing by gender; it yielded a nondecision. Presented with the ques-
tion whether Philadelphia could maintain sex-segregated secondary
schools for academically gifted boys and girls, the Court was disarmed.
Split four-to-four, the Justices could reach no determination and the
judgment below, two-to-one for the school district, remains the last
word in the controversy.6 6 The district judge in Vorchheimer, who had
ruled against the school district, thus establishing a tie vote among all
the federal judges who considered the case, commented: "A lower
court faced with [the Supreme Court's post-1970's] line of gender dis-
crimination cases has an uncomfortable feeling, somewhat similar to a
[player at] a shell game who is not absolutely sure there is a pea."67
In sum, the Supreme Court in the 1970's has been tugged in a new
direction by arguments urging accommodation of constitutional doc-
trine to a changed social climate. But the development to date has been
uneven, insecure, and marked by sharply divided opinions.65 In large
measure, the original understanding serves as a counterweight to more
65. 430 U.S, 703 (1977), qg / , an equalr di ided court 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976).
66. The Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1228, 1608, 1701-10,
1712-16, 1720, 1721, 1751-58 (1976). as interpreted by the Fifth Circuit, however, provides a solu-
tion for most cases involving sex-separated public schools-the Act outlaws student assignments
olely on the basis of race, color, se-v or national origin. See United States v. Hinds County
School Bd.. 560 F,2d 619 (5th Cir. 1977) (sex-Neparated public high school system violates EEOA).
67 400 F. Supp. 326. 340-41 (ED. Pa 1975), rev'd, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), afjdbran
cquallr dnrided ourt, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
6S. The Court's path has meandered most when childbearing women complained of disad-
%,antageous treatment. To date, the Court's majority does not recognize discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy as discrimination on account of sex. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125 (1976). The Title VII determination in General Electric was overturned by Congress. Pub. L.
No. 95-555, Oct. 31, 1978 (amending 42 U.S C. § 2000e to proscribe, expressly, discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy).
Using due process rather than equal protection as the handle, the Court held, in Cleveland Bd.
of Educ v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), that school teachers may not be dismissed or placed on
involuntary leave arbitrarily at a fixed stage of pregnancy well in advance of the expected delivery
date. 4ccord, Turner v. Department of Employment Security. 423 U.S. 44 (1975) (pregnant wo-
men ready, willing, and able to work may not be denied unemployment compensation when jobs
are closed to them). But no equal protection shoal is encountered, the Court ruled, when a state-
operated comprehensive disability insurance plan excludes normal pregnancy. Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
Confronting another facet of women's reproductive capacity, the Court held in 1973, in Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, that due process prohibits a state from
interfering arbitrarily with the decision of a woman and her doctor to terminate a pregnancy by
abortion. Some four years later, in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), the Court ruled states may
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secure doctrinal development. It is one thing to find dynamism sup-
porting Brown v. Board of Education,69 the landmark 1954 school de-
segregation decision, in an amendment centrally addressed in the
framers' minds to race discrimination. 0 It is more difficult to elaborate
bold doctrine regarding sex discrimination when even a starting point
is impossible to anchor to the constitutional fathers' design.7'
III. THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
Originated by the National Woman's Party in 1923,72 the ERA was
designed to complement the nineteenth amendment. Proponents ex-
plained when the measure was first introduced in Congress:
[A]s we were working for the national suffrage amendment ... it was
borne very emphatically in upon us that we were not thereby going to
gain full equality for the women of this country, but that we were merely
taking'a step ... toward gaining this equality.
7 3
The idea was to correct or perfect Mr. Jefferson's text. Women were
not included in his formulation: "All men are created equal."74 As to
females, Thomas Jefferson said: "Were our state a pure democracy,
there would still be excluded from our deliberations. . . women, who,
to prevent depravation of morals and ambiguity of issues, should not
mix promiscuously in gatherings of men.""
encourage childbirth over abortion by denying Medicaid reimbursement for nontherapeutic
abortion.
In contrast to the Court's separate cubbyholing of these issues, Professor Karst has emphasized
their interrelationship. Not only the challenges to explicit male-female legal lines, but the repro-
ductive choice and illegitimacy cases as well, Karst explains, present various faces of a single
issue-the roles women are to play in society, their opportunity to participate in full partnership
with men in the nation's social, political, and economic life. Karst, Book Review, 89 HARv. L.
Rav. 1028, 1036 (1976); Karst, supra note 17, at 57-58 & n.320.
69. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
70. See Bickel, The Original Understanding andthe Segregation Decision, 69 HARy. L. RLv, 1
(1955).
71. See L. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 160 (1. Dilliard ed. 1952).
72. S.J. Res. 21, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 65 CONG. REC. 150 (1923). The text of the proposed
amendment reads: Men and women shall have equal rights throughout the United States and
every place subject to its jurisdiction. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appro-
priate legislation.
73. Hearings on H.R.J Res. 75 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 2d Sess.
2 (1925) (statement of Mabel Vernon, Exec. See'y, National Woman's Party). Clear statement of
the position of early proponents appears in Matthews, Women Should Rae Equal Rights With
Men, A Reply, 12 A.B.A.J. 117 (1926).
74. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, July 4, 1776.
75. Quotedin M. GRUBERG, WOMEN IN AMERICAN POLITIcs 4 (1968).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss1/19
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Framed as a basic human rights norm, the ERA has two offices.7 6
First, it directs federal and state legislatures to undertake conforming
legislative revision. The Amendment stipulates a two-year period for
this mop, broom, and paint operation.7 7 Second, it directs the judiciary
to a clear source for the constitutional principle, men and women are
equal before the law.
Gender-based classifications still clutter the lawbooks of nation and
state. At the federal level alone, the Department of Justice7 ' and the
Commission on Civil Rights79 have identified several hundred statutes
with sex-based references. Some examples: The Aid to Families with
Dependent Children program provides support for the two-parent fam-
ily with an unemployed father, but not for the family with an unem-
ployed mother.8" Men have priority over women in job training and
placement under the work incentive program.81 Comprehensive Social
Security Act changes to accord women more equitable treatment await
congressional attention. 2
Even new legislation reflects traditional notions about woman's
place. The Public Accommodations Title (II) of the Civil Rights Act of
1964" covers race, religion, and national origin, but not sex. A Con-
gress ready to close the "White Cafe" was not prepared to end the
"Men's Grill." In the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972,14 Congress re-
peated the formula built into the Social Security Act in 1939. Benefits
were provided for a miner's wife or widow, but not for a miner's hus-
76. S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), is the most concise congressional document
explaining the design and expected application of the ERA. Leading commentary is Brown,
Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment. A Constitutional Basis for Equal
Rightsfor Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971).
77 Section 3 of the ERA reads: "The amendment shall take effect two years after the date of
ratification."
78. See Task Force on Sex Discrimination, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice, In-
terim Report to the President (Oct. 3. 1978); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit at 37-38, app. E, Moritz v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d 466
(10th Cir. 1972) (Solicitor General's listing of "provisions of the United States Code containing
differentiations based upon sex-related criteria"), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906 (1973).
79. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SEX BIAS IN THE U.S. CODE (1977).
SO. 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1976); S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 160 (1967). The consistency
of this classification with the equal protection principle will be considered by the Supreme Court
in Califano v. Westcott, 460 F. Supp. 737 (D. Mass.) (holding such classification unconstitutional),
prob. juri. noted, 99 S. Ct. 718 (1978).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 633 (1976).
82. See DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, REPORT OF THE HEW TASK FORCE ON
T-HE TREATMENT OF WOMEN UNDER SOCIAL SECURITY (1978).
83 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1976).
84. 30 U.S.C. § 901 (1976) (amended 1978).
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band or widower.8 5 An alert senator spotted the omission, but rather
than tamper with the statutory text, he relegated his discovery to a com-
ment in the Senate report accompanying the bill.86
Thousands of state laws, most of them historical hangovers, typecast
men and women.87 Alabama authorizes recovery for the father, but not
for the mother, on the wrongful death or injury of a child.88 Missouri
and Tennessee persisted into 1979 in exempting "any woman" from
jury service.89 Oklahoma provides a custody preference for mother
when the child is of tender years, for father when the child is of an age
to require education and preparation for labor or business. 90
Yes, the job of revising outmoded sex-based laws could be done
without an ERA. But history strongly suggests the task will remain on
a legislative backburner absent the stimulus explicit constitutional com-
mitment would supply.91 As stated by the American Branch of the In-
ternational Law Association (Human Rights Committee) in a 1976
report: Authoritative formulation of the basic norm is an "indispensa-
ble step toward defense and fulfillment of [a] human right."92 Only
upon official commitment to the norm can we proceed securely to
"measures of implementation," arrangements designed to promote ef-
fective application of the norm.
Women and men with consciousness and expectations raised have
enlisted the courts in the cleanup operation. Given the legislative foot-
dragging, that means a parade of challengers attacking a host of obso-
85. 30 U.S.C. § 902(a)(2)(e) (1976).
86. S. REP. No. 743, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1972) (in view of possibility that a miner may be a
female, the terms "wife" and "widow" should be construed to include "husband" and "widower").
87. For comprehensive treatment, see B. BROWN, A. FREEDMAN, H. KATZ & A. PRICE, WO-
MEN'S RIGHTS AND THE LAW-THE IMPACT OF THE ERA ON STATE LAWS (1977). See also Com-
ment, Equal Rights Provisions: The Experience Under State Constitutions, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 1086
(1977).
88. See Thorne v. Odom, 349 So. 2d 1126 (Ala. 1977). Alabama is also among a dwindling
minority of states with legislation authorizing post-divorce maintenance (alimony) for women
only. Off v. On, 351 So. 2d 904 (Ala. App.), cert. quashed, 351 So. 2d 906 (Ala. 1977) (per
curiam). On March 5, 1979, the Supreme Court reversed the Alabama judgment and held the
gender criterion unconstitutional. 99 S. Ct. 1102 (1979).
89. This practice was held unconstitutional in Duren v. Missouri, 99 S. Ct. 664 (1979). See
generally Daughtrey, Cross Sectionalism in Jury-Selection Procedures After Taylor v. Louisiana,
43 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1975).
90. See Gordon v. Gordon, 557 P.2d 1271 (Okla.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 185 (1978).
91. The long campaign to secure the vote for women is instructive. Effort to achieve change
state by state was debilitating and ultimately unsuccessful. See E. FLEXNER, CENTURY OF
STRUGGLE 228 (rev. ed. 1975).
92. AMERICAN BRANCH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS AND COM-
MITTEE REPORTS 81 (1975-76).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss1/19
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lete laws one by one before federal and state judges,93 jurists under-
standably reluctant to press into heavy service an equal protection
provision never intended by its framers to deal with sex discrimination.
Just as the ERA should end legislative inertia that keeps outdated laws
on the books, so the Amendment should relieve judicial anxiety, the
uneasiness judges feel in the gray zone between interpretation and al-
teration of the Constitution.
The ERA, proponents and legislative history point out, is not a
.,unisex" amendment. It does not stamp man and woman as one. (The
common law did that, and it declared man The One.9 4 ) The Amend-
ment does not command similarity in result, parity, or proportional
representation. It is phrased as a negative check on government, a pro-
hibition against use of gender as a factor in official classification.9"
Majestic human rights guarantees are seldom absolute and the ERA
is no exception. Thus, two qualifications are marked in the legislative
history.96 The first relates to "the potty problem." The Senate Judici-
ary Committee's majority report explains the congressional expectation
that the ERA would coexist peacefully with separate public restrooms,
separate sleeping and bathroom facilities for male and female military
personnel and prisoners. (Perhaps Congress found it hard to conceive
of a plaintiff litigating the issue, or of a judge who would find man or
woman harmed by that limited separation.) The second exception re-
lates to legislation dealing narrowly and particularly with physical
characteristics unique to one sex; the regulation of sperm donations,
or the financing of pre- and post-natal maternal health clinics, for
example.
Some critics have suggested it would be wiser to include these and
perhaps further qualifications in the text of the Amendment.9" Other
basic human rights guarantees bear on evaluation of the charge that the
93. E~g., Orr v. Orr, 351 So, 2d 904 (Ala. App.), cert. quashed, 351 So. 2d 906 (Ala. 1977),
rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 1102 (1979); Missouri v. Duren, 556 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1977), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 664
(1979).
94. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 442-45.
95. See S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972).
96. Id. at 12.
97. E.g., Hearings on Hi.J Res. 638 Before the Subcomm. on Civil& Const. Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary
. 
95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 112-15 (1977-78) (statement of Erwin N.
Gnswold, former Solicitor General of the United States); Freund, The Equal Rights 4mendment is
Not the Wav. 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 234 (1971); Kurland, The Equal Rights Amendment:
Some Problems of Construction, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 243 (1971).
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ERA is overbroad and should be returned to the drawing board for
enumeration of exceptions.
"Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press." 98 Is this first amendment formulation unwise because it
does not specify "except for words threatening to precipitate an imme-
diate breach of the peace or generating grave and irreparable danger to
national security?" These are exceptions, of course, although they do
not appear in the text.99
"Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise of reli-
gion."' 0 Would it improve the text to add expressly, "but the legisla-
ture, for secular purposes, may ban polygamy, snake handling, make
Sunday but not Friday or Saturday a work-free day?"''
The ERA's generality fits the Constitution's design. Grand, general
statement would not do for a tight statute, but it is the style appropriate
for a constitution expected to govern for generations. Yes, there will be
work left for the judiciary. No one can predict with complete assurance
how the Amendment will be interpreted and applied in every instance
in which it may be relevant. 0 2 But this much is beyond debate: judges
will find in the ERA's legislative history, particularly the Senate Judici-
ary Committee's majority report, 10 3 considerably more guidance than
they now have from the legislative branch in measuring gender dis-
crimination claims against an equal protection standard.
Distortion and confusion have attended the ERA debate. Exorbitant
claims have been made on both sides about what the Amendment will
and will not do. It is, after all, not a case like the vote for eighteen-
year-olds,"° in which the meaning of the text is free from doubt. Nor
is the vulnerability of the ERA surprising in the light of history. "The
ERA will wreck the home and family" is perhaps the most publicized
98. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
99. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW chs. 12, 13
(9th ed. 1975).
100. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
101. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (polygamy); State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E,2d 179 (same), appeal
dismissedsub noa. Bunn v. North Carolina, 336 U.S. 942 (1949); Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99
(Tenn. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976) (snake handling); Hardin v. State, 188 Tenn. 17,
216 S.W.2d 708 (1948) (same).
102. See Marchioro v. Chaney, 582 P.2d 487 (Wash. 1978) (en banc court divided on question
of compatibility with state ERA of legislation requiring that the two members elected to Demo-
cratic Party's state committee by county committees be of opposite sex).
103. See notes 76, 95-96 supra and accompanying text.




broadside. Antisuffragists raised the same cry. If women gain the vote,
they said, it will change the basis of our government from the family as
a unit to the individual. It would lead to disaster, it would prove de-
structive of the highest interests of the home. 05
Rational ERA opponents would concede, however, that if the ERA
i,, kept out of the Constitution, weak families will not get one whit
stronger.0 6 But on the loss side, should ERA ratification fail, the risk
is real that the trend toward opening opportunities to women will be
slowed, if not halted. Actors in the political arena might well take de-
feat of the ERA as a demonstration that feminists lack clout, 07 so that
positions and programs they support'"8 can be ignored safely, or at
least deferred.
In this respect, the ERA is symbolic. A comment by Justice Rehn-
quist during a November 1, 1978, Supreme Court oral argument makes
the point. A gender-based classification had been challenged, and an
attorney for the challenger had just completed her argument when the
Justice volunteered: "You won't settle for putting Susan B. Anthony
on the new dollar then?" '
The ERA clarifies that tokens will not suffice. It calls upon Congress
and state legislatures to undertake earnestly, systematically, and perva-
sively, the law revision long overdue. And in the event of legislative
default, the Amendment arms the judiciary with an unassailable basis
105. See A. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 1890-1920, at 17-
1'.5(1971); cf I I REPORTS OF THE NEw YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION COMMITTEES CONCERNED
'. ITH FEDERAL LEGISLATION, The Equal R.'hts Amendment-As of 1972, Bull. 2, at 38,41 (1972)
i"Any. . favorable treatment required by some women because of their ... family roles could
be preserved by statutes which utilize those factors-rather than sex-as the basis for
distinction.").
106 Over the past decade, in most states, family law has been revised in the direction of sex
neutrality See 3 FAM. L. REP. 4047, 4051-52 (1977): Freed & Foster, The Economic Incidents of
Divorce. 7 FAti. L.Q. 275 (19 7 3); Freed & Foster, Taking Out the Fault but not the Sting, TRIAL 10
(\pr. 1974). In these states, the ERA will necessitate no basic change in orientation. Moreover,
the Supreme Court's decision in Orr v. Orr, 99 S. Ct. 110 (1979), signals the current unconstitu-
tionality of gender-based classification in this area.
107. Cf Forrester, The Feminiss-lhr Have They Not Yet Succeeded?, 61 A.B.A.J. 333
(1975).
108. Eg., quality child-care programs, measures to reduce the incidence of family violence,
flexible hours in gainful employment, legislation to ameliorate the disadvantageous economic po-
,itiOn of homemakers, improved delivery of health services, extension of all antidiscrimination
aws. to cover sex, more vigorous enforcement of current antidiscrimination provisions. See NA-
-IONAL COMMISSION ON THE OBSERVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S YEAR, THE SPIRIT OF
tIousToN (1978).
10). Transcript of Argument at 19, Duren v. Missouri, 99 S. Ct. 664 (1979); see Johnston, Jr. &
Knapp. Sex Discrimination b;' Lai .4 Studr in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 675 (1971).
Number 1]
Washington University Open Scholarship
178 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1979:161
for applying the bedrock principle: All men and all women are guaran-
teed by the Constitution equal justice under law.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss1/19
